Dr Ian Gold's 1 interesting statements and arguments in relation to (neurobiological) reductionism in psychiatry require further discussion, as some of them are problematic and countered by previous work.
2,3 The statement: "It is a near universal belief among psychiatrists that the future of psychiatric theory and treatment lies in a reductionist research program" 1, p 506 is not evidence-based, as implied in the related editorial by Dr Paul Grof, 4 nor is it conceptually sound, as it is unclear what is meant by the term near-universality, which may be untestable. As such, it risks incorrectly and harmfully labelling psychiatrists as intellectually naive.
The argument: "if mental illness is a form of brain pathology, then one ought to treat the illness by ministering to the brain" 1, p 507 commits a fallacy, as even if mental illness is (only) a form of brain pathology, ministering to the brain-presumably by so-called biological means such as medications, rather than by psychosocial means such as psychotherapy-may not be more, or even as, effective than psychosocial interventions for mental illness. Indeed, the brain is now known to be plastic, in response to both psychotherapy and other learning experiences. 5 The statement: "metaphysics has no consequences for the development of science" 1, p 509 is controversial if not false, as scholars of science have demonstrated that metaphysics facilitates if not enables theoretical development in science. 6 The implied identification: "facts about the stuff that objects are made of" 1, p 509 with metaphysics misconstrues metaphysics, which is widely agreed to consist of theories (rather than facts) about the stuff that objects are made of; further, metaphysics has been argued to consist of untestable theories, which, if modified to be tested, are argued to move from the realm of metaphysical theories to the realm of scientific theories. 7 The argument: "the hypothesis that psychiatry will be reduced to biology is itself an empirical hypothesis; it cannot be decided by metaphysical arguments," 1, p 509 and the related statement: "Metaphysical (or other) arguments about what has to be the case are entirely at odds with general scientific method," 1, p 511 ignore an argument from philosophy of science that reductionism and similar doctrines may be neither metaphysical nor empirical, but rather epistemological, and as such may not postulate what has to be the case and may be fully compatible with, if not fundamental to, general scientific method. 
Re: Reduction in Psychiatry
Dear Editor:
Dr Rudnick offers 3 objections to the views I defend.
One is based on a misreading. Dr Rudnick characterizes as a fallacy the claim that "if mental illness is a form of brain pathology, then one ought to treat the illness by ministering to the brain." This is not my view, however, but a view that I put in the mouth of the reductionist. Here, therefore, there is no disagreement between us.
Dr Rudnick objects to some of what I say about the role of metaphysics in science. In particular, he argues that metaphysics may facilitate scientific advances, and that metaphysical arguments may be compatible with scientific method. I do not deny that there may be useful interactions between metaphysics and science. What I deny is that metaphysics can do the work of science. In particular, metaphysical views about the fundamental constituents of the universe provide no reason whatsoever for thinking that there can be a reductionist theory of the mind, or, indeed, of anything else. Whatever metaphysics can do for science, it cannot determine what good scientific theories will actually look like.
Finally, Dr Rudnick objects to my claim that reductionism "is a near universal belief among psychiatrists" both because it may be untestable and-if I understand him correctly-because many psychiatrists deny it. I am not sure why Dr Rudnick thinks that the popularity of reductionism could not be tested by asking psychiatrists what they think. (Perhaps he worries that there could be disagreement about the exact percentage of psychiatrists who would have to be committed to reductionism for it
